Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Identity theory (philosophy of the mind): the thesis that mind states are nothing but states of the brain. Types of identity theory are the weaker assumption of a type-type identity and the stronger assumption of a token-token identity._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Gerhard Vollmer on Identity Theory - Dictionary of Arguments
I 271 Identity Theory/Vollmer: no evidence of neurophysiology will ever be sufficient to prove the identity theory. >Proofs, >Provability. Reason: explanation: which can be explained by the assumption of an entity, always can be explained by the adoption of two entities. >Theories, >Hypotheses, >Premises, >Explanation, >Causal explanation. II 90 Identity/identity theory/Vollmer: ((s) here: identity of the mind with a physical realization): not all properties must match. - E.g the optical and haptic impression of an apple are not identical. ((s)Vs: these are extrinsic properties.) >Properties, >Qualities, >Sensory impressions._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
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> Counter arguments in relation to Identity Theory
